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INTRODUCTION 
I am delighted to participate in this festschrift for Professor Marshall 
Shapo—friend, colleague, and leading figure in constitutional torts. 
Professor Shapo’s paper, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape, and the 
Frontiers Beyond, has been credited with coining the term that now defines 
the field.1 How fitting that the paper appeared in the Northwestern University 
Law Review at the very dawn of Professor Shapo’s career as a law 
professor—a few years after Monroe v. Pape came down,2 a few years before 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents extended constitutional tort liability 
from state to federal officials,3 and several years before Professor Shapo 
joined the Northwestern Law faculty in 1978. We now celebrate Professor 
Shapo’s work in the pages of the same Law Review. 
Professor Shapo’s paper surveyed and helped to map the emerging field 
of constitutional tort litigation. Returning to the piece today, one finds a close 
reading of the legislative history of the Ku Klux Klan Act and § 1983, a 
careful sifting of the relevant pre-Monroe decisions, and a frank appraisal of 
the issues that would mark the development of constitutional tort litigation 
for the next several decades.4 Professor Shapo charted the expansion of 
§ 1983 litigation and wrestled with the federalism implications of federal 
judicial responsibility for the front-line oversight of local police 
departments,5 a role that has grown no less urgent over time.6 
But Professor Shapo never lost sight of the claims of simple justice that 
underlie both the congressional attempt to address lawless Klan activity 
during Reconstruction and the frequent examples of Jim Crow-era police 
violence that drove the Supreme Court to broaden the federal role of the 
judiciary during the Second Reconstruction.7 His simple test—outrageous 
misconduct—would identify matters appropriate for federal oversight and 
would leave state courts in control of the more routine matters of prison and 
police misconduct.8 In evaluating Professor Shapo’s test, one might 
 
 1 Marshall S. Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape, and the Frontiers Beyond, 60 NW. U. L. 
REV. 277, 323–24 (1965); Michael Wells, Thomas A. Eaton & Sheldon H. Nahmod, Why Constitutional 
Torts Deserve a Book of Their Own, 22 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 857, 857 (1999). 
 2 365 U.S. 167, 167 (1961). 
 3 403 U.S. 388, 388–91 (1971). For an account of the facts that gave rise to the search of the Bivens’s 
home, see James E. Pfander, The Story of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau 
of Narcotics, in FEDERAL COURTS STORIES 275, 290–94 (Vicki C. Jackson & Judith Resnik eds., 2010).  
 4 Shapo, supra note 1. 
 5 Id. at 282–94, 324–29.  
 6 See JARED P. COLE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44104, FEDERAL POWER OVER LOCAL LAW 
ENFORCEMENT REFORM: LEGAL ISSUES 1 (2016). 
 7 Shapo, supra note 1, at 279–82, 325 n.246. 
 8 Id. at 327. 
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acknowledge that outrageousness as the standard of unconstitutional police 
conduct lacks the crispness of a rule. But then so does the current standard, 
which allows the recovery of damages only upon a showing that the officer 
violated clearly established law.9 In some settings, the tests converge: 
outrageous conduct enjoys no qualified immunity even when existing 
Supreme Court precedent does not clearly forbid the conduct in question.10 
In other settings, however, the Court’s demanding qualified immunity 
decisions make it harder to argue that outrageous conduct alone will suffice 
to justify an award of damages.11 
Professor Shapo understandably had less to say in that article about 
Bivens and its recognition of constitutional tort claims against federal 
officers. Writing in the early 1960s, well before the Bivens decision came 
down in 1971, Professor Shapo nonetheless saw such cases looming on the 
horizon.12 He referred to Bell v. Hood—a 1946 precursor to the Bivens 
decision that left open the issue of whether constitutional tort liability 
extended to federal officials13—as a “fascinating case,” albeit one that 
presented issues of federal judicial power distinct from those at the heart of 
the “color of law” inquiry for state and local officials addressed by the 
Monroe line.14 In subsequent work, he did not take up the Bivens problem 
directly, although his rumination about the creation in Monroe of a federal 
common law of police misconduct15 and his reflection on the differences 
between constitutional swords and shields16 certainly helped to anticipate and 
provoke future scholarship after Bivens was decided.17 Overall, Professor 
Shapo’s work adds depth and texture to our understanding of policy-based 
constitutional tort claims. 
 
 9 See Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 546 (2012) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 
223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982))). 
 10 See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 745–46 (2002) (holding that the “obvious cruelty” of shackling 
a prisoner to a hitching post for hours at a time provided respondents with adequate notice that their 
conduct was unconstitutional). 
 11 See, e.g., Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 306–08 (2015) (extending qualified immunity to an 
officer who, against the orders of his superior, fatally shot a suspect fleeing in his vehicle); Safford 
Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 368 (2009) (conferring qualified immunity on a school 
official who, suspecting the presence of contraband, conducted a strip search of a thirteen-year-old girl). 
 12 Shapo, supra note 1, at 287 n.45. 
 13 327 U.S. 678, 684–85 (1946). 
 14 Shapo, supra note 1, at 287 n.45. 
 15 Id. at 326–27. 
 16 Id. at 303 (invoking the sword and shield metaphor to distinguish defensive use of constitutional 
rights to block criminal enforcement and offensive use of constitutional rights to bring civil actions for 
damages against government officials). 
 17 See, e.g., Walter E. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L. 
REV. 1532, 1541 (1972); Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term — Foreword: 
Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 23–24 (1975).  
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Monroe is best known for expanding § 1983 to reach all constitutional 
violations that take place under color of state law.18 Tracing its history, 
Professor Shapo reports that § 1983 litigation began to grow after the Court 
held that, in the criminal context, “color of law” extended to actions taken 
by local officials under the pretense of law.19 Intriguingly, Professor Shapo 
reports that many of the pre-Monroe cases from the 1940s and 1950s arose 
as claims of police brutality, only some of which appear, in his telling, to 
have been racially motivated.20 The early judicial focus on police brutality 
suggests that the rise of constitutional tort litigation owes much to the Court’s 
efforts to address extreme forms of policing that had come to include home 
invasion, unwarranted detention, and third-degree police interrogation. 
Monroe and Bivens both alleged precisely these forms of police misconduct 
and both included a racial subtext.21 
Subsequent cases refined the Monroe standard. Monell v. Department 
of Social Services clarified that local governments were subject to liability 
under § 1983, overruling the contrary conclusion in Monroe.22 But the 
Monell Court also held that cities and counties were not liable on a theory of 
respondeat superior for the wrongful acts of their officers and employees; 
they were only liable where the local government itself had a custom or 
policy that violated federal law.23 Today, much of the litigation over the 
nature of Monell liability focuses on whether city and county practices rise 
to the level of a custom or policy for § 1983 purposes.24 Some high officials 
in city or county governments effectively make policy; the decisions and 
 
 18 See Shapo, supra note 1, at 277–78. 
 19 Id. at 284–87. 
 20 Id. at 288–90. 
 21 Both Bivens and Monroe were Black men, living in major cities, and both were the targets of 
aggressive policing in their own homes. Bivens alleged that he was manacled while police upended his 
entire house and was then taken to a courthouse “where he was interrogated, booked, and subjected to a 
visual strip search.” Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 
389 (1971). Monroe’s claim arose out of a similar warrantless raid and arrest: police broke into 
petitioner’s home while he slept and made him “stand naked in the living room” while officers ransacked 
the house. Monroe v. Pape , 365 U.S. 167, 169 (1961). On the racial subtext of the two cases, see Myriam 
E. Gilles, Police, Race and Crime in 1950s Chicago: Monroe v. Pape as Legal Noir, in CIVIL RIGHTS 
STORIES (Myriam E. Gilles & Risa L. Goluboff eds., 2007).  
 22 436 U.S. 658, 662–63 (1978). 
 23 Id. at 691, 694. 
 24 See, e.g., Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 57 (2011) (addressing claim that failure to train 
prosecutors constituted a policy or practice); Los Angeles County v. Humphries, 562 U.S. 29, 32–33 
(2010) (considering claim that defendant had established a policy of listing parents on Abuse Index); 
Shields v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 746 F.3d 782, 785, 789 (7th Cir. 2014) (addressing claim that provision of 
substandard medical care represented an unconstitutional policy or custom). 
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actions of such policymakers can sometimes translate directly into city or 
county liability if the policy happens to violate the Constitution.25 
In this Essay honoring Professor Shapo, I tackle a growing problem in 
constitutional litigation: the problem of how to litigate clandestine federal 
government policies. In addition to its well-known hostility to Bivens 
litigation as a general matter, the Supreme Court has expressed particular 
antipathy toward the use of a Bivens suit to test the legality of government 
policies. Chief Justice Roberts gave voice to that view during the oral 
argument of Ziglar v. Abbasi;26 he observed that Bivens provided an improper 
vehicle for challenges to a detention policy of the federal government, such 
as the detain-clear-and-deport policy that lay at the center of the Ziglar 
litigation.27 To the Chief Justice’s way of thinking, such policy challenges 
were best mounted in suits for injunctive and declaratory relief.28 Sure 
enough, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Ziglar, denying any right to 
sue for damages when contesting detention policy, echoed the Chief Justice’s 
comment about the inapplicability of Bivens to policy disputes.29 During oral 
arguments in Hernandez v. Mesa, a cross-border shooting case, counsel was 
careful to point out that the victim’s family was challenging not the policy 
of the Customs and Border Patrol but the rogue activities of a single border 
patrol officer.30 
Whatever one’s view of the Court’s turn against Bivens litigation as a 
general matter, one might doubt the wisdom of this new hostility to the use 
of Bivens to evaluate federal government policies. This Essay gives voice to 
such doubts in one specific context: While litigants can test the 
constitutionality of most federal action by using habeas, injunctive, or APA 
forms of action, clandestine government policies evade review through such 
channels. Rather than placing such policy-testing Bivens litigation beyond 
the reach of federal courts, the Supreme Court should recognize its essential 
role in clarifying constitutional boundaries. 
 
 25 Policy-based Monell liability does not attach to federal agencies under the Bivens doctrine. See 
FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 486 (1994). 
 26 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017). 
 27 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 30–33, Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (No. 15-1358).  
 28 Id. at 47; see 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–706 (2018) (providing for the judicial review of agency action). 
 29 See Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1860 (citation omitted) (“[A] Bivens action is not ‘a proper vehicle for 
altering an entity’s policy.’”). 
 30 Transcript of Oral Argument at 24, Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735 (2020) (No. 17-1678) 
(“[W]e are not challenging a policy of the government. We are claiming Respondent himself did not 
comply with that policy.”). 
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I. ZIGLAR V. ABBASI AND CHALLENGES TO GOVERNMENT POLICY 
The Supreme Court’s hostility toward policy-testing Bivens litigation 
became clear in Ziglar. The suit was brought to challenge the 
constitutionality of the federal government’s decision in the wake of the 
September 11th attacks to round up and detain immigrants on the basis of 
their religious (Muslim) and ethnic (Arab and South Asian) identities.31 
Those rounded up were held in punitive conditions of confinement until 
cleared of involvement with the terrorist attacks.32 Errors, poor judgment, 
and deliberate cruelty were in plentiful supply.33 After the Second Circuit 
allowed the case to proceed on claims based on the Fourth Amendment 
(punitive strip searches) and the Fifth Amendment (equal protection and 
substantive due process),34 the Court granted review and rejected the viability 
of all such policy-focused Bivens claims.35 
The question of the proper role of Bivens litigation arose both during 
the argument and in Justice Kennedy’s opinion. In expressing his concern, 
the Chief Justice observed that the high government officials responsible for 
formulating an anti-terrorism policy in the heat of the moment may worry 
about the threat of individual liability.36 Such worries might wrongly 
influence the direction of the policies adopted; “we don’t want people 
forming policy to have to worry about [if] they’re going to have to—to pay 
if the—if the policy is found infirm.”37 Later, returning to the point, the Chief 
Justice expressed a preference for reliance on “normal injunctive action” as 
the best way to challenge the constitutionality of the policy, calling it “a more 
appropriate way of doing it than . . . individual damages actions against 
officials responsible.”38 
The Chief Justice’s concerns found their way into Justice Kennedy’s 
majority opinion. Justice Kennedy characterized the claims against Attorney 
General John Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert Mueller as matters of 
 
 31 Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1852–53. 
 32 Id. at 1853. 
 33 See Brief for Respondents at 3–10, Ziglar, 137. S. Ct. 1843 (No. 15-1358) (detailing the round-up 
and abuse of Plaintiffs).  
 34 Turkmen v. Hasty, 789 F.3d 218, 233–38 (2d Cir. 2015).  
 35 See Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1853–54, 1869 (overruling the Second Circuit). Only the claims against 
Warden Hasty, challenging the conditions of confinement, were allowed to proceed. Id. at 1869. 
 36 Transcript of Oral Argument at 33, Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (No. 15-1358). 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. at 47. The Chief Justice’s preference for injunctive forms of constitutional adjudication calls to 
mind an influential argument that prospective relief encourages constitutional change by lessening the 
cost to government that would accompany the imposition of retrospective damages liability. See John C. 
Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87, 90 (1999). 
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“detention policy.”39 If such suits were permitted, “high officers who face 
personal liability for damages might refrain from taking urgent and lawful 
action in a time of crisis.”40 This was the very concern with overdeterrence 
that the Chief Justice had identified. Justice Kennedy added that the “burden 
and demand” of litigating policy issues would distract officials from the 
“discharge of their duties” and would raise sensitive national security 
concerns.41 
After addressing the problem of overdeterrence, Justice Kennedy 
picked up the Chief Justice’s expressed preference for litigation of such 
policy matters through suits for other forms of relief. Justice Kennedy 
explained that the plaintiff’s detention policy claims did not focus on 
“individual instances of discrimination or law enforcement overreach, which 
due to their very nature are difficult to address except by way of damages 
actions after the fact.”42 Rather, they sought to challenge “large-scale policy 
decisions concerning the conditions of confinement imposed on hundreds of 
prisoners.”43 Such issues were, in Justice Kennedy’s view, more properly 
addressed through suits for injunctive relief or perhaps “via a petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus.”44 
II. THE REALITY OF PERSONAL LIABILITY 
In assessing Ziglar, one must reckon with the Supreme Court’s 
antipathy to the use of Bivens as a vehicle to challenge government policy. 
One key concern was familiar: the Court has long worried that a regime of 
personal liability may over-deter federal officers.45 But in the past, the Court 
had focused its overdeterrence concern on the calibration of its (judge-made) 
qualified immunity doctrine.46 In that setting, the Court has moved steadily 
to an ever more protective standard, first by immunizing officers except 
where they violate clearly established law, and then by redefining the clear-
law requirement to demand exceptionally clear statements of controlling 
 
 39 Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1858. 
 40 Id. at 1863. 
 41 Id. at 1860–61. 
 42 Id. at 1862. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. at 1862–63. 
 45 See James E. Pfander, Alexander A. Reinert & Joanna C. Schwartz, The Myth of Personal 
Liability: Who Pays When Bivens Claims Succeed, 72 STAN. L. REV. 561, 574–76 (2020). 
 46 See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512–16 (1978) (remedying the concern of 
overdeterrence by extending absolute immunity to federal administrative agents who make independent 
adjudicatory or prosecutorial determinations in the course of their official conduct). 
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law.47 As a result of the qualified immunity doctrine, officials acting to craft 
and implement federal policy with Department of Justice (DOJ) advice enjoy 
a substantial margin of appreciation (to borrow the European construct) and 
face little risk of personal liability.48 Ziglar goes further, treating the threat 
of personal liability for officers as a basis for denying an individual’s right 
to sue under Bivens.49 More than a source of protection for officers acting in 
the shadow of uncertain law, Ziglar immunizes even the most clear-cut 
violations of law. 
One can question the concern with personal liability on both logical and 
practical grounds. As a logical matter, the doctrine already takes account of 
the threat of overdeterrence, having conferred a qualified immunity defense 
to moderate personal liability. Ziglar double-counts that concern by folding 
it into the evaluation of the plaintiff’s right to sue as well. As a practical 
matter, recent scholarship casts serious doubt on the Court’s assumption that 
the incidence of Bivens liability falls on the officers held responsible for 
constitutional torts. In a study of who pays when Bivens claims succeed, my 
two co-authors and I found that the federal government pays the entire 
amount of the judgment in over 95% of the successful claims brought against 
federal officers by inmates of the Bureau of Prisons (BOP).50 While the study 
focused on only one Bureau within the DOJ, its findings suggest that the 
federal government takes steps to indemnify or hold federal officials 
harmless from any liability they incur on the job.51 One might well doubt that 
the imposition of Bivens liability for policies adopted by high-ranking 
government officials would ever result in their paying the ultimate award out 
of their personal assets.52 
 
 47 In Harlow v. Fitzgerald the Court established that officers have immunity unless they violate 
“clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” 
457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Since then the Court has narrowed what constitutes an established right, with 
a recent case defining it as “one that is sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have 
understood that what he is doing violates that right . . . . [E]xisting precedent must have placed the 
statutory or constitutional question beyond debate. Put simply, qualified immunity protects all but the 
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 
(2015) (emphasis added) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
 48 Margin of appreciation is a doctrine of judicial deference. It is applied by the European Court of 
Human Rights to allow party states to vary their application and enforcement of the terms of the 
Convention based on national norms and pressing state interests. See Erin F. Delaney, Analyzing 
Avoidance: Judicial Strategy in Comparative Perspective, 66 DUKE L.J. 1, 35–39 (2016). 
 49 See Pfander, Reniert & Schwartz, supra note 45, at 561. 
 50 Id. at 566. 
 51 Id. 
 52 The practice of indemnity has a long history, stretching back to the early Republic. See James E. 
Pfander & Jonathan L. Hunt, Public Wrongs and Private Bills: Indemnification and Government 
Accountability in the Early Republic, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1862, 1866 (2010). 
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As a consequence, Bivens litigation closely resembles the suits for 
injunctive, declaratory, and habeas relief that the Court favors as vehicles for 
the contestation of government policy. All these forms of litigation proceed 
by naming an official of the federal government, rather than the government 
itself, and all pose threats of burdensome discovery and litigation. Moreover, 
in all of these forms of litigation, the government regards the resulting 
judgment as a binding determination of the applicable law, including the law 
specifying the government’s obligations. Even the vanishingly small 
prospect of personal liability has been imposed exclusively on low-level line 
employees: our study found no pre-Ziglar dispositions that had imposed 
personal liability on high-level, policy-making government officials.53 The 
threat of personal monetary liability under Bivens for policymakers can thus 
be best described as theoretically possible, but practically nonexistent. 
III. LIMITED ALTERNATIVES 
If the facts surrounding its actual operation cast doubt on the Ziglar 
Court’s conclusion that the Bivens personal liability regime skews the 
incentives of policymakers, consider the comparative effectiveness of the 
alternative forms of litigation. The law of standing restricts suits for 
injunctive and declaratory relief, as well as petitions for habeas relief from 
unlawful custody; only those in custody have standing to challenge the fact 
and conditions of their confinement through injunctive and declaratory 
litigation or through habeas petitions.54 The well-known decision in City of 
Los Angeles v. Lyons, in which the plaintiff sought to contest the chokehold 
policy of the LAPD, illustrates the standing problem.55 Lyons sought two 
forms of relief: damages for a past chokehold (which, the Court held, Lyons 
had standing to pursue) and injunctive and declaratory protection from the 
continuation of the city’s chokehold policy.56 The Court found that Lyons, 
though subjected to chokeholds in the past, lacked standing to mount a 
prospective challenge.57 He was viewed as no more likely than anyone else 
in Los Angeles to suffer a future chokehold.58 
Lyons means that the plaintiffs in cases like Ziglar will almost always 
lack standing to pursue prospective challenges to the detention policy at 
 
 53 See Pfander, Reniert & Schwartz, supra note 45, at 580–81.  
 54 See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983) (finding that after defendant was 
released from custody he could no longer show a sufficiently plausible threat of future injury); Carafas v. 
LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238 (1968) (explaining that to file a habeas petition, the defendant must be in 
custody in violation of federal or constitutional law). 
 55 461 U.S. at 98. 
 56 Id. at 98, 109. 
 57 Id. at 105. 
 58 See id. at 111. 
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issue. After they have been cleared and deported, those who were once 
subject to the government’s detention policy no longer have standing to 
maintain a challenge to its constitutionality. To be sure, some plaintiffs may 
be able to evade this barrier and contest detention policy by initiating a class 
action while still subject to the conditions in question.59 In other words, had 
Lyons filed suit on behalf of a class during the course of being subjected to 
a chokehold, the action may have been allowed to proceed. Similarly, had 
the plaintiffs in Ziglar filed suit while subject to custody, those challenges to 
detention policy might have gone forward. But the conditions in which the 
Ziglar plaintiffs were held prevented contact with lawyers or others who 
might have gotten such litigation underway before it was mooted by 
deportation.60 Even if a class action had proceeded, the termination of the 
program would have effectively ended any live dispute.61 These standing and 
mootness problems with coercive (injunctive and habeas) forms of relief cast 
doubt on Justice Kennedy’s easy assumption that plaintiffs had alternative 
means to challenge the detention policy in Ziglar.62 
Generalizing, the standing problems that undercut the use of coercive 
relief to challenge policies in Ziglar will virtually foreclose injunctive-style 
challenges to most clandestine government practices. Consider, for example, 
the Bush Administration’s programs of “enhanced interrogation,” 
“extraordinary rendition,” and “black site detention.”63 All of these policies 
were approved by the DOJ without fanfare. The highly confidential torture 
memos were not made the subject of notice-and-comment rulemaking and 
were not subject to judicial review through the processes of the APA.64 
Instead, the torture memos provided the confidential, internal legal predicate 
for a program of disappearance and torture that was overseen by members of 
the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense.65 
Individuals, like Maher Arar and Khaled El-Masri, who were shipped to 
 
 59 See, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 106–07, 110 n.11 (1975) (stating that conviction of the 
named respondents did not moot the unnamed class members’ claim for injunctive relief from denial of 
a hearing to determine the legality of their pretrial detention); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 399 (1975) 
(holding that the fact that the named plaintiff now meets the residency requirement she was challenging 
does not moot the claims of other class members). 
 60 Brief for Respondents at 6–8, Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137. S. Ct. 1843 (2017) (No. 15-1358). 
 61 See N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York, 140 S. Ct 1525, 1526 (2020) (holding 
that the City’s amendment to its handgun transport scheme that removed the prohibitions challenged by 
the defendants mooted their claims for declaratory and injunctive relief). 
 62 See Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1862–63. 
 63 For an account of these practices and evaluation of the viability of Bivens litigation to contest them, 
see JAMES E. PFANDER, CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS AND THE WAR ON TERROR 35–37, 42–56 (2017).  
 64 On the development of the torture memos, see JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE: THE INSIDE STORY 
OF HOW THE WAR ON TERROR TURNED INTO A WAR ON AMERICAN IDEALS (2009).  
 65 Id. at 219–37. 
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Syria and Afghanistan respectively, to undergo torture under the watchful 
eye of federal officials, had no access to lawyers or to courthouses in which 
to mount a challenge to their treatment.66 The whole point of the 
extraordinary rendition of high-value suspects to black sites was to evade the 
possibility of any judicial oversight.67 
Both Arar and El-Masri were denied damages relief under Bivens.68 
Given the law of standing, how might such individuals bring suit to 
prospectively challenge the policies to which they were subjected? 
Obviously, individuals subject to waterboarding cannot politely request 
leave during a break in the proceedings to file a petition for judicial review. 
From any practical perspective, litigation to test the constitutionality of 
torture must take the form of a suit for damages, filed after the challenged 
proceedings have ended and the subject has gained some measure of 
freedom. Justice Kennedy’s statement in Ziglar, that Bivens does not provide 
a proper vehicle for the assertion of policy challenges, in effect immunizes 
many government policies (like torture) from judicial review, even when 
those implementing the policy predictably inflict grievous injuries. 
IV. LITIGATING TORTURE POLICIES 
Ziglar’s prohibition against policy-based challenges makes it 
essentially impossible to test the legality of clandestine torture programs. 
Imagine a suit brought by an individual who credibly alleges that she was 
tortured in a federal detention facility in the United States pursuant to a 
government-sponsored policy of enhanced interrogation. Instead of suing the 
architects of the torture policy (officials comparable to the policymakers 
immunized in Ziglar), the suit is brought against the low-level officials of 
the FBI or BOP who inflicted the torture. As a matter of international law, 
the Convention Against Torture makes every official responsible for his or 
her own violations of the Convention.69 But the Convention Against Torture 
 
 66 See Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 565–69 (2d Cir. 2009) (detailing defendant’s detention and 
torture); El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 300–01 (4th Cir. 2007) (same). For a first-hand account 
of the kidnap and torture of El-Masri, a German car salesman with no connection to any terrorist 
organization, see Khaled El-Masri, America Kidnapped Me, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2005 12:00 AM), 
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2005-dec-18-oe-masri18-story.html [https://perma.cc/7ZBB-
KL7E]. 
 67 On the role of the United States in the overseas detention of terrorism suspects, see Ben Taub, 
Guantánamo’s Darkest Secret, NEW YORKER (Apr. 15, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com
/magazine/2019/04/22/guantanamos-darkest-secret [https://perma.cc/K3HB-W8BF]. 
 68 See Arar, 585 F.3d at 563; El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 300. 
 69 See United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment art. 2–4, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100–20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (signed 
by U.S. April 18, 1988). Treaty effectiveness often dates from the President’s ratifying a treaty to which 
the Senate has consented, not the Senate’s vote to consent to a treaty. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
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has no federal implementing statute that authorizes individuals to seek civil 
redress for acts of torture. Instead, Congress and the State Department relied 
on the existence of the Bivens suit and § 1983 litigation as the mechanisms 
by which the United States (and the individual states) were to comply with 
the Convention’s requirement that signatory nations create a framework for 
individuals to seek civil redress for acts of torture.70 
How well will the Bivens action perform its torture civil-redress 
function? The victim might try to persuade the Court that she has suffered 
an improper seizure under the Fourth Amendment so as to bring her claim 
within an established Bivens context. But torture obviously differs in 
important ways from a domestic drug enforcement search and seizure at an 
apartment in New York (the context in Bivens).71 And, moreover, the officers 
responsible for the hypothesized torture do not report to the same agency (the 
Federal Bureau of Narcotics) that conducted the search of the Bivens home.72 
The government would doubtless argue that the torture claim arises in a 
“new” context for purposes of Ziglar analysis, creating a higher threshold 
for plaintiffs to overcome in persuading a court to allow the action to 
proceed.73 Moreover, most of the torture claims in the law reports of the 
federal courts raise substantive due process issues.74 The Court in Ziglar was 
careful to treat the Fifth Amendment punitive–confinement substantive due 
process claims against Warden Hasty as presenting a separate issue than 
those raised by Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment claims.75 
Recognition that it arises in a new context under Ziglar may defeat the 
proposed Bivens claim for torture. But the official can tender a policy-based 
defense as well. The torture memos were designed to furnish federal officers 
with a defense to criminal liability for torture overseas;76 one might suppose 
that similar memos would serve equally well in supplying a defense against 
civil liability for torture in the United States. Note that the officers carrying 
out torture protocols in the United States can claim that their actions were 
 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 303 reporter’s notes 3 (AM. LAW INST. 1987) 
(recognizing that it is the “President [who] makes, ratifies, or accedes to a treaty on behalf of the United 
States,” while “the Senate gives its consent to ratification”). A treaty may enter into force in accordance 
with its terms among other signatory nations before the United States accedes to its terms. 
 70 See PFANDER, supra note 63, at 107–10. 
 71 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971). 
 72 Id. 
 73 Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1864 (2017). 
 74 See, e.g., Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 563 (2d Cir. 2009); El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 
296, 300 (4th Cir. 2007). 
 75 See Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1863–64. 
 76  MAYER, supra note 64, at 151–55, 230 (discussing the memos’ rationale of using wartime powers 
as a defense to criminal liability).  
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taken pursuant to official policy and thus arguably enjoy immunity from 
scrutiny under the Bivens doctrine. The low-level officers involved in 
implementing the detain-clear-and-deport policy at issue in Ziglar were, like 
Ashcroft and Mueller, apparently immune from Bivens liability.77 
As previously explained, the Convention Against Torture provides that 
superior orders or policies cannot immunize inferior officers from liability 
for torture.78 One might argue that the Convention countermands Ziglar and 
vitiates any policy defense that the officers might tender to claims of torture. 
But the Supreme Court’s approach to the effectuation of the nation’s treaty 
obligations would not obviously call for the treatment of the Convention 
Against Torture as self-enforcing on this point. The Court held in Medellin 
v. Texas that treaties bind the United States in its relations with its treaty 
partners but presumptively require Congress to enact legislation to make the 
treaty effective in the domestic legal order.79 Federal courts accordingly take 
the same cautious approach to recognizing implied rights to enforce treaty 
obligations that they apply to the recognition of Bivens suits: in general, they 
refuse to give effect to treaties without an act of Congress.80 That 
presumptive conclusion may gain force in the interpretation of the 
Convention Against Torture: Congress recognized that implementing 
legislation was necessary to make certain Convention obligations effective 
but it did not codify a civil redress scheme for torture and did not explicitly 
countermand the invocation of policy-based defenses to any existing Bivens 
torture claims.81 With injunctive and habeas relief practically unavailable, 
one sees little prospect for civil redress of government-sponsored torture 
claims. 
V. CHALLENGING GOVERNMENT POLICY 
Government policy played a central part in the debate over § 1983 
liability, albeit one quite different from its role in Ziglar. Writing for the 
Monroe majority, Justice Douglas defined color of law along lines specified 
 
 77 See Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1869 (dismissing all of the detention policy Bivens claims against federal 
officials but allowing claims for prison conditions to proceed against Warden Hasty). 
 78 The Convention states that “[a]n order from a superior officer or a public authority may not be 
invoked as a justification of torture.” United Nations Convention Against Torture, supra note 69, at art. 
2(3). 
 79 552 U.S. 491, 504–06 (2008) (establishing a presumption that treaties require implementing 
legislation to take effect in the domestic order). 
 80 See id. 
 81 See generally MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL32428, U.N. CONVENTION 
AGAINST TORTURE (CAT): OVERVIEW AND APPLICATION TO INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES (2009) 
(providing an overview of U.S. implementing legislation related to the Convention Against Torture). The 
Torture Victim Protection Act, 106 Stat. 73, provides civil redress for victims of torture imposed under 
color of the law of foreign nations. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
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in earlier decisions to include all actions under pretense of government 
authority, including those that may also violate the law or policy of the local 
jurisdiction.82 Seeking to preserve local judicial control of unlawful police 
conduct, Justice Frankfurter dissented from this broad conception of 
§ 1983’s reach.83 For Justice Frankfurter, the random and unauthorized 
actions of rogue police officers were not properly attributed to the 
government for which they worked and were not actions under color of law 
for purposes of § 1983.84 Only where the action of an officer was taken 
pursuant to a state governmental policy could it be properly treated as having 
occurred under color of state law.85 Justice Frankfurter illustrated his 
suggested distinction by ruling out § 1983 claims for much of Officer Pape’s 
misconduct in searching the plaintiff’s home without a warrant and 
threatening members of his family.86 But as to the allegations that the plaintiff 
had been detained in a criminal investigation on open charges, pursuant to a 
local custom or policy to that effect, Justice Frankfurter agreed that the 
allegations satisfied the color of law standard.87 For the Monroe Court, then, 
constitutional tort-based challenges to government policy, through suits 
brought against responsible officials, were the least controversial feature of 
the new regime. 
Although the instinctive opposition to suits for money in Ziglar has also 
reshaped § 1983 norms to a significant degree, it may be worth considering 
how one might incorporate the § 1983 view of policy into litigation against 
federal officers. It no longer seems possible to count on state law (as Justice 
Frankfurter urged in Monroe) to provide civil redress against unauthorized 
federal police conduct; the 1988 Westfall Act largely displaces state law as 
a source of official liability whenever the federal officers were acting in the 
course and scope of their employment.88 But one might treat the Federal Tort 
Claims Act (FTCA) as the vehicle for the assertion of intentional tort claims 
against rogue federal law enforcement officers. Under the FTCA, the federal 
government would bear financial responsibility for all such successful tort 
claims.89 By incorporating state law norms, however, the FTCA makes no 
 
 82 Monroe, 365 U.S. at 171–72, 184, 187. 
 83 Id. at 239–43 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 84 See id. at 236–39 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 85 Id. at 236–37 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 86 Id. at 203, 258 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 87 Id. at 258–59 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 88 See James E. Pfander & David Baltmanis, Rethinking Bivens: Legitimacy and Constitutional 
Adjudication, 98 GEO. L.J. 117, 121–23 (2009). 
 89 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2018) (“The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of 
this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under 
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provision for the assertion of constitutional tort claims.90 That remains the 
province of Bivens litigation, for better or worse.91 If, as Frankfurter and the 
Monroe Court agreed, challenges to unconstitutional policies deserve a 
hearing, then the preservation of the Bivens action for that purpose likely 
provides the only effective mechanism for ensuring review of classified 
government programs.92 
CONCLUSION 
It seems quite surprising, when taking stock of the current status of 
federal official accountability, to reflect on the changes of the past century. 
The twentieth century began with the presumptive viability of common law 
tort claims against federal officers.93 Suits for injunctive relief to challenge 
federal government action were also widely available to supplement federal 
statutes that created their own modes of judicial review.94 Many of the major 
legislative and judicial developments of the twentieth century aimed to 
supplement, rather than displace, the common law baseline. Thus, the APA 
preserves non-statutory review as a supplement to suits under agency organic 
statutes;95 the Bivens line of cases established a federal right of action but 
said nothing to suggest that the state common law remedy had been 
displaced;96 the FTCA was amended to supplement rather than displace the 
Bivens action;97 and the Westfall Act eliminated the state law tort claim 
 
like circumstances . . . .”). For an overview of the FTCA, see KEVIN M. LEWIS, CONG. RSCH, SERV., 
RL45732, THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT (FTCA): A LEGAL OVERVIEW (2019). 
 90 See, e.g., FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 478 (1994) (“[T]he United States . . . has not rendered 
itself liable under [the FTCA] for constitutional tort claims.”). 
 91 See Loumiet v. United States, 828 F.3d 935, 945 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“Federal constitutional claims 
for damages are cognizable only under Bivens . . . .”). 
 92 To be sure, the state secrets privilege may pose challenges to the litigation of suits that implicate 
national security concerns. For an account, see Laura K. Donohue, The Shadow of State Secrets, 159 U. 
PA. L. REV. 77, 78–81, 87–91 (2010) (detailing how the federal government invokes state secret privilege 
to thwart litigation). 
 93 See James E. Pfander, Dicey’s Nightmare: An Essay on the Rule of Law, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 737, 
754–57 (2019).  
 94 See James E. Pfander & Jacob P. Wentzel, The Common Law Origins of Ex Parte Young, 72 STAN. 
L. REV. 1269, 1346–48 (2020).  
 95 See Air Courier Conf. of Am. v. Am. Postal Workers Union, 498 U.S. 517, 523 n.3, (1991) 
(explaining that congressional preclusion of judicial review under the APA does not affect the jurisdiction 
of federal courts); Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 188–89 (1958) (holding that non-statutory review of 
federal agency action is available when the agency has violated a mandatory legal requirement); Larson 
v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 689–90 (1949) (stating that non-statutory review 
of federal agency action is available when the agency action is ultra vires). 
 96 For an in-depth analysis of this issue, see Carlos M. Vázquez & Stephen I. Vladeck, State Law, 
the Westfall Act, and the Nature of the Bivens Question, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 509, 542–50 (2013). 
 97 See Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 88, at 132–33. 
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against the officer on the assumption that the combined force of Bivens and 
the FTCA would assure government accountability.98 
Despite these legislative efforts to preserve the common law baseline, 
suits to hold federal officials accountable for certain kinds of constitutional 
violations have become almost entirely futile. The common law right to sue, 
cornerstone of nineteenth century understandings of the rule of law, has 
largely disappeared. While some Justices continue to urge the relevance of 
the common law baseline to notions of due process,99 others have expressed 
a surprising impatience with any discussion of the subject. Thus, in the recent 
oral argument in Hernandez v. Mesa, Chief Justice Roberts expressed open 
disdain for the lessons of the nineteenth century’s commitment to 
accountability at common law.100 Instead, the Chief Justice emphasized cases 
from the last several years that have slowly dismantled the Bivens action.101 
Even the “outrageous misconduct” that Professor Marshall Shapo rightly 
viewed as obviously actionable now evades adjudication, especially when 
the action in question has been taken pursuant to federal government policy. 
As we celebrate his contributions to the field, that is a dispensation that I am 
honored to join Professor Shapo in rejecting. 
 
 98 Id. at 134–38 (arguing that the Constitution requires remedies for government wrongdoing and 
that the Westfall Act, properly interpreted, seeks to ensure their availability). 
 99 See Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1224–25 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“[T]he weight 
of the historical evidence shows that the [Due Process Clause] sought to ensure that the people’s rights 
are never any less secure against governmental invasion than they were at common law.”). 
 100 Transcript of Oral Argument at 9–10, Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735 (2020) (No. 17-1678). 
 101 Id. 
